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Abstract: In times of increasing oil prices and a weak dollar, European 
companies that focus their business on the US market may find themselves 
in a weak position. While many businesses can hedge this kind of risk by 
relocating production to the US, or employing financial remedies, these 
strategies may not work throughout the consumer goods industry. Especially 
for brands whose consumption is strongly impacted by country of origin 
(e.g. French whine, Swiss chocolate, German beer, etc.), there are only 
limited possibilities to bypass these challenges. To react efficiently to these 
threats, managers need a precise picture of complete market mechanisms 
before they can set up an appropriate marketing strategy to react. We aim to 
enhance the understanding of market mechanisms that are caused by 
exogenous cost shocks for typical consumer goods. The contribution of our 
work is twofold: To investigate the underlying process and to derive 
concrete managerial suggestions. We hereby propose a combination of two 
different empirical frameworks to measure the effects of exchange rate 
variations in fast moving consumer markets. Furthermore we extend 
existing work in being the first to model vertical interactions with a 
Manufacturer-Wholesaler-Retailer Model. 
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Within this framework we investigate how changes in local currency affect 
the strategic management variables of price, margin and profit in a typical 
consumer goods market. While it is widely known that exchange rate 
changes cause variations in export/import prices and numerous studies show 
that the effect of currency fluctuations decreases within the distribution 
process, recent marketing research in this area has not explicitly accounted 
for the mechanisms that occur within the distribution channel. Many 
empirical studies implicate that exogenous cost shocks, which are caused by 
exchange rate changes, are passed through imperfectly to final consumer 
prices. We therefore show that the margins of the players involved in the 
distribution process will be affected differently by exchange rate variation 
dependent on the competitive situation. Although our empirical study 
focuses on the effect of exchange rate variations on strategic marketing 
variables of a selected fast moving consumer good, our framework can be 
easily adapted to any other market and other sources that cause a change in 
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1. Introduction 
In times of increasing oil prices and a weak dollar, European companies, which focus their 
business on the US market, may find themselves into a weak position. While many businesses 
can hedge this kind of risk by relocating production to the US, or employing financial 
remedies, these strategies may not work throughout the consumer goods industry. Especially 
for products whose consumption is strongly impacted by country of origin (e.g. French whine, 
Swiss chocolate, German beer, etc.), there are only limited possibilities to bypass these 
challenges. To react efficiently to these threats, managers need a precise picture of complete 
market mechanisms before they can set up an appropriate marketing strategy to react. We aim 
to enhance the understanding of market mechanisms that are caused by exogenous cost 
shocks for typical consumer goods.  
When deriving a profit-maximizing price strategy in a foreign market, possible changes in 
local currency have to be considered. It is known that exchange rate fluctuations cause 
variations in export and import prices (e.g., Goldberg & Knetter, 1997). However, numerous 
studies, theoretical as well as empirical, find that the effect of currency fluctuations decreases 
towards the final consumer price (e.g Bacchetta & Wincoop, 2003), or even becomes 
insignificant (Campa & Goldberg, 2006). Some authors argue that a major determining factor 
of the impact of currency variation on price and margin is channel length (e.g. Clark, Kotabe 
& Rajaratnam, 1999). 
The effects that may occur when exchange rates are volatile can be contrasted by a simple 
example of cross-border pricing (see Fig. 1): Given that a manufacturer M produces a product 
in the country of its origin (in the following referred to as home), causing manufacturing cost 
c measured in his homeland currency €, exchange rate variations exr will enter his decision 
making while passing the border to a foreign country (in the following referred to as foreign) 
with a different currency $. If the product is distributed via a wholesaler (W) and a retailer (R) 
to the final consumer (DEMAND), all changes in consumption caused by variations in price, 
i.e. q(PR$) will enter manufacturer’s target function indirectly via a non-trivial price 
mechanism. Hence exchange rate changes that force manufactures to change their import 
prices PM$ will have an impact on the profit function as long as consumer demand q(PR$) 
reacts to price changes. The extent of this effect strongly depends on how much of the price 
adjustment will be passed through to the final consumer price PR$, i.e. how much will be 
captured by W and R. 
 3
 
Fig. 1: A simple Example of Cross-border Pricing 
This implicates that exogenous cost shocks caused by exchange rate changes might be passed 
through imperfectly to final consumer prices. Clearly, a change in cost that is incompletely 
passed through leads to changes in margins, i.e. Δ. We therefore expect that the margins of all 
players involved in the distribution process can be affected by exchange rate variation. This 
raises the question: Who actually benefits or is harmed by exchange rate variation? 
To address this research question we apply two different theories:  
(1) In keeping with the New Empirical Industrial Organization (NEIO, e.g. Bresnahan, 
1989), we set up a structural econometric model which enables us to capture the 
distribution process drafted in Fig. 1. Although our empirical study focuses on the 
effect of exchange rate variations on strategic marketing variables of a selected fast 
moving consumer good, our framework can be easily adapted to any other market and 
other sources that cause changes in production cost. Recent work in quantitative 
marketing research has focused on the effects of competition and channel interaction 
in national markets using the NEIO methodology (e.g. Kadiyali, Sudhir & Rao, 2001). 
Although these models are applied to various marketing problems, e.g. product line 
extensions (Draganska & Jain, 2001; Kadiyali, Vilcassim & Chintagunta, 1999) 
advertising (Chintagunta, Kadiyali & Vilcassim, 2003) and channel interaction 
(Sudhir, 2001; Besanko, Dubé & Gupta, 2003; Villas-Boas & Zhao, 2005), less 
attention has been paid to problems in an international environment. The increasing 
globalization of business activities makes it more and more necessary for marketing 
managers to learn about what kind of marketing-mix strategies work in the 
international context.  
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(2) To measure the extent of the effect of exchange rate variations on strategic 
management variables (i.e. prices, margins and profit), we adopt the exchange rate 
pass-through-concept (ERPT) common in empirical trade theory. The ERPT is defined 
as the extent to which exporters pass along exchange rate-induced margin 
increases/decreases by lowering/raising prices in export market currency terms (see 
e.g. Goldberg & Knetter, 1997). 
To gain an insight into the market mechanisms for a typical consumer good, we use a micro 
econometric framework that incorporates three different intermediaries in the distribution 
process, i.e. manufacturer, wholesaler and retailer. This model of “twice double 
marginalization” is incorporated into a structural choice model that follows the tradition of 
Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995), hereafter referred to as BLP. Given the estimation 
results, we follow Goldberg (1995) in calculating ERPT coefficients for various exchange rate 
changes by performing counterfactual experiments. 
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 details our model and discusses all necessary 
assumptions. Dataset and estimation results are briefly described in Section 3. The results of 
the counterfactual experiments are presented in Section 4 and Section 5 evaluates these 
results. 
 
2. Model Formulation 
The framework in which we construct our model consists of two different parts. In the first 
part, we follow the NEIO tradition of constructing a structural econometric framework that 
enables us to measure consumer’s choice, competitive behaviour and supply conditions 
(sections 2.1 – 2.3). Taking the distribution process of a typical consumer good market into 
account, we additionally integrate vertical relations into our model. In the second part, we 
clarify the ERPT-concept, which enables us to quantify the impact of exchange rate changes 
on market outcomes (section 2.4). In section 2.5 we derive hypothesis that will be part of our 
empirical investigation. 
 
2.1 Demand Model 
Our demand model is based on a random coefficient random utility specification, now 
commonplace in the analysis of differentiated demand for consumer goods (e.g. Nevo, 2000). 
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Following the work of McFadden (1974), a logit framework can be used to address discrete 
choice problems in differentiated product markets (e.g. Anderson, Palma & Thisse, 1992). 
To capture the demand side within the structural model, consumers are assumed to choose the 
product which maximizes their utility. Each utility is a function of product attributes and 
individual characteristics. However, the researcher can only observe some attributes and 
characteristics. Idiosyncratic tastes and marginal utility for a particular good might vary over 
consumers. Thus utility to consumer h from purchasing product i is: 
, ,h i i h i h i h iu X pγ β ξ ε= − + + , (2.1) 
where Xi are observable exogenous variables, pi is the observed price for product i, ξi are 
unobservable product characteristics and εh,i is an individual-product specific unobservable. 
We assume that taste parameters βh and γh may differ for each consumer. Following Nevo 
(2001) we decompose the individual taste parameters into mean values β, γ and consumer 
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While β and γ  are assumed to be invariant across consumers, σh might vary. 
Consumer-specific taste variation is assumed to consist of two parts: observed individual 
characteristics (e.g. demographics) and unobserved additional characteristics. Given that no 
individual information is available, neither component of individual characteristics is 
observed. To overcome the lack of information we add the additional demographic 
information Dh to account for observable variation in taste. The unobserved component is 
assumed to be a normally distributed stochastic process νh with mean zero and constant 
variance. The the formally given distribution for both components, σh, becomes 
h hD hσ ν≡ Π +Σ , (2.3) 
where Π is the matrix of coefficients that measures how taste characteristics vary with 
demographics and Σ is a matrix of coefficients that measures the influence of unobserved 
variations (e.g. Nevo 2000). 
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Given these specifications, equation (2.1) can be decomposed into three different parts (Berry, 
1994): 
, ,h i i h i h iu ,δ μ ε= + +  (2.4) 
All product-specific parts that do not vary across consumers are incorporated in the mean 
utility δi ≡ Xiγ - piβ + ξi. Idiosyncratic taste variations from the mean are included in  
μh,i ≡ [- pi, Xi] σh where [- pi, Xi] is a 1 × (K+1) row vector. The last two terms represent a 
mean-zero heteroscedastic deviation from the mean utility that captures the effects of the 
random coefficients. If we assume that the individual product-specific unobservable εh,i is 
i.i.d. extreme-value distributed, it can be integrated out in the multinomial logit model 


















If no idiosyncratic taste variation exists, i.e. if all consumers behave in the same way, 





























At the true values of δ and market shares s this equation holds exactly. To find the true values 
of δ that match observed and predicted shares, equation (2.7) has to be inverted (Berry, 1994). 
In the standard MNL case, δ can be inverted analytically. So equation (2.7) becomes 
( ) ( )ln lni O i i h i hs s X p iδ γ β− = ≡ − +ξ
                                                
, (2.8) 
 
1 We assume that the indirect utility of the “no purchase” option is set to zero. 
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Where so is the market share of the outside good. Finally we can use standard instrumental 
variable estimation techniques to estimate the unknown parameters. 
However, if consumers vary in their purchasing behaviour, the assumption of homogenous 
taste preferences may lead to biased estimation results. If we try to capture idiosyncratic 
variations from the mean, we encounter two problems: First, we have to match market shares 
with each consumer’s purchasing probability. Due to the unknown number of consumers in 
the population, we have to use simulation techniques to approximate the integral that joins the 
probabilities. Second, we need to invert the mean value δi to estimate the underlying 
parameters. Due to the nonlinearity, which results from the first step, the inversion must be 
done numerically. 
To recover the true parameters, Berry (1994) suggests a contraction mapping procedure which 
can be incorporated within the estimation procedure: 
1
,ln ln ( , ; , )
d d d
i i i i i h is sδ δ δ μ
+ = + − Π Ω  (2.9) 
where si are the observed shares and si(..) the predicted shares, given by the mean of Ph,i. BLP 
show that for every starting value δ d converges to a fixed point. Given the mean utility, our 
estimation problem becomes 
( )i i i iX pξ δ γ= − − β
                                                
. (2.10) 
Given appropriate instruments, (2.10) can be estimated by generalized method of moments 
(GMM). 
 
2.2 Supply Model 
For a consumer goods industry, it is reasonable to assume that manufacturers do not serve the 
final consumer directly. Furthermore, manufacturers have to pass along a distribution line. In 
our proposed model, we assume that the distribution to the final consumer is reached by 
passing two intermediaries (i.e. retailer and wholesaler2). This distribution structure can be 
incorporated into a “twice double marginalization” model (see Fig.2 for an illustration of our 
suggested model). 
 




Fig. 2: A Model of Twice Double Marginalization 
 
2.3 Model Assumptions: 
To model the vertical strategic interaction (VSI) between manufacturers (Mi and Mj), 
wholesaler (W) and retailer (R), we assume that the competition in the distribution channel is 
given by the so-called Manufacturer-Stackelberg (MS) game (Choi, 1991). Furthermore, 
assuming that only two competing manufactures exist, the horizontal strategic interaction 
(HSI) between these players can be measured by the unspecified conduct parameters Θi,j and 
Θj,i. For simplification, we additionally assume that wholesaler and retailer act as perfect 
category managers (e.g. Sudhir, 2001). To capture the effect of exchange rate change exr on 
market outcome, we assume that all relevant production costs are given in the home country 
currency of M3. Consumer behaviour is incorporated into our model given the stated 
assumptions in the previous section. If we assume that all players involved maximise their 
profits, we can calculate price-cost margins (PCM) for every stage in the distribution process. 
                                                 
3 Thereby we rule out exchange rates to have a double impact in the decision process. 
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Price Cost Margins: 
As we assume a MS game, the last stage of the game has to be solved first, meaning we must 
observe the maximization problem of R before we can calculate W and finally M’s decisions. 
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− − = − +⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟∂ ∂⎝ ⎠
. (2.11) 
Analogously, we can calculate the first order condition for W as 
( )
1
j ji i i i
i i I i
i i j j i j
p ps p p s
w m c s
p w w p w w
−
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ∂ ∂∂ ∂ ∂ ∂





To calculate the PCM for W, i.e. eq. (2.12), we need to know the change in final consumer 
price p given marginal changes in wholesale price w. Given consumers reactions, i.e. ∂si/∂pi 
and ∂si/∂pi, we can partially derivative (2.12) with respect to wi and wj. Clearly, the price 
decision of W given marginal changes in the import price m can also be obtained by the 
partial derivative of (2.13) with respect to mi and mj. Given this, the first order condition for 
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The left-hand side (LHS) of equation (2.13) shows manufacturer i’s margin. Intuitively, the 
margin depends on the marginal production cost, which is a function that can be affected by 
exchange rate variation exr. Thus, neglecting the right-hand side (RHS) of (2.13), a firm that 
follows a constant margin strategy would increase its price just as much as the marginal costs 
are changed by a cost shock caused by currency variations. This would imply a pass-through 
of 100% on prices. Clearly this strategy cannot be efficient because it disregards the strategic 
effect of price on purchased quantity. As pointed out before, given consumers, channels and 
competitor response, every change in price will have a substantial impact on the 
manufacturers’ market share. In our purposed model, market response is given by the 
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derivative of firm i’s market share with respect to the final consumer price of its own brand 
and that of the competitors. The competitive response of the RHS can be deconstructed into 
two different sources of influence: To the extent that the pricing policy of both manufacturers 
has no direct impact on final consumer prices, VSI enters equation (2.13), i.e. ∂p/∂w and 
∂w/∂m. Besides the vertical relationship, we have to account for the influence of the 
competitive game played by the manufacturers, i.e. the HSI, on the pricing decision. While 
we initially do not specify the conduct parameters Θj,i and Θi,j, we can integrate them as 
additional parameters into our estimation routine.4
Following the NEIO methodology, two different approaches can be used to derive 
information about the underlying HSI game: the menu approach, which ex ante sets up 
different types of games (i.e., parameters for Θj,i and Θi,j), and the conjectural variation 
approach, which estimates Θj,i and Θi,j from the data (Kadiyali, Sudhir & Rao, 2001). We will 
use both approaches to gain insight into the degree of manufacturers’ brand competition. 
 
2.4 Measuring Exchange Rate Pass-Through 
Following trade theory, we define the extent to which exchange rate induced price changes 
are translated to demanders of a product via exchange rate pass-through ERPT (see e.g. 
Goldberg, 1995). Formally, the ERPT is given by the ratio between a percentage change in 
















 with { }p , ,i i ip w m∈ 5 (2.14) 
In our model, three different types of ERPT could be identified: (I) between manufacturer and 
importer (II) between importer and retailer and (III) between retailer and final consumer. 
Although ERPT-coefficients could be calculated analytically, due to the complexity of our 
model we follow Goldberg (1995) in computing them by performing counterfactual 
experiments. Thereby we estimate the structural model described in section 2.1 and 2.2 using 
exchange rate variation as an additional instrument in the first step. Given our estimation 
                                                 
4 Note: all necessary derivatives for MNL Model can be found in the appendix. 
5 Given this structure, the ERPT coefficient might be interpreted as an elasticity coefficient of on how sensitive 
prices react on exchange variations. Please note that this approach is not only limited to price changes caused by 
currency variations. Other sources (e.g. energy cost, transportation cost, etc.) that influence prices can also be 
calculated. 
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results, we use simulation techniques to evaluate the effects of cost shocks triggered by 
currency variation on market outcomes (e.g. prices, margins and profits) of all players 
involved. Using the given results we compute (2.14) for a range of different exchange rate 
variations. Additional details are given later on. 
2.5 Hypothesis 
Given our model described in the subsections before, we propose the following hypotheses:  
As conventional modern trade theory dictates (e.g. Goldberg & Knetter 1997), we expect that 
exchange rate changes are passed through imperfectly within the distribution process (H1). 
Recent empirical studies in trade theory focus primarily on the effects of currency on export 
or import prices rather than on final consumer prices and thereby only mainly concentrate on 
H1. While this might be sufficient for macroeconomic policy decisions, marketing decisions 
need a more precise picture. Building on our framework presented in the subsections above, 
we are able to test the influence of exchange rate variations on a more precise level that 
incorporates various decision makers. 
As we expect the exchange rate pass-through to be imperfect, it is straightforward to assume 
that margins buffer exchange rate variations (H2). This hypothesis is also supported but not 
tested within the conceptual framework of Clark, Kotabe and Rajaratnam (1999). 
While we focus mainly on the impact of currency variations that directly impact 
manufacturers behaviour, we also explore how exchange rate changes affect the decisions 
making within the distribution process. Following Bacchetta and van Winccop (2003) we 
expect that the effect of exchange rate variations decreases towards final consumer price 
(H3). 
This also implies that the actors in the distribution process are affected differently by 
exchange rate variations (H4). 
As margins tend to be a crucial factor that influences the extent of pass-through, i.e. H2, we 
expect that the degree of competition has an impact on the exchange rate pass-through (H5). 
This hypothesis is also supported but not tested by the theoretical work of Chang and Lapan 
(2003). As margins tend to be higher for lower degrees of competition, we also suggest that a 
lower degree of competition imply a lower exchange rate pass-through (H6). 
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3. Empirical Study 
3.1 Data 
We apply our model to the product category “premium beer brewed in Europe” that is 
distributed in the US. While this market is fragmented, we focus on the two leading European 
beer exporters, Heineken and Beck’s, which claim dominant market shares in this product 
category (see e.g. Modern Brewery Age, 1995). Many studies provide evidence that exported 
European beer is substantially affected by currency variations (e.g. Glauben & Loy, 2002; 
Knetter, 1989; Goldberg & Knetter, 1999) and underline the effect of exchange rate variation 
on market outcomes and strategic marketing decisions (see Heineken Shareholder Conference 
2003). 
To perform our empirical analyses within our model of twice double marginalization, we 
combine two different types of data sources:  
1.) Retail data taken from the second largest supermarket chain in the greater Chicago 
area, in order to model the relationship between consumers, retailer and wholesaler.6  
2.) Foreign trade statistics, assuming that the reported retail data from Chicago is a subset 
of imported beer imported into the US. The United States Department of Agriculture 
Foreign Agricultural Service reports monthly sales data on “beer made from malt in 
glass less than 4 litres” for Germany and the Netherlands. Beck’s and Heineken are 
the leading beer exporters in their countries to the US market and claim a market share 
of more than 75 percent of beer exports from their countries. We use this information 
as a proxy for import prices. 
 
                                                 
6 We used Dominick's Finer Food Data reported by the University of Chicago Graduate School of Business. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive statistics of endogenous variables 
 
Brand Variable Max Mean Min SD 
Beck’s Import price 1.26 1.19 1.13 0.04 
 Wholesaler price  2.6 2.46 2.29 0.1 
 Final consumer price 3.18 2.75 2.47 0.19 
 Quantity 7638 3203.31 823 1243.91 
 Share 0.10 0.04 0.01 0.01 
Heineken Import price 1.369 1.31 1.27 0.03 
 Wholesaler price  2.59 2.5 2.34 0.09 
 Final consumer price 3.28 2.98 2.55 0.21 
 Quantity 8823 3102.60 789 1550.85 
Share (%) 14 4 1 3 
 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics of all endogenous variables included in our empirical 
study. On average, we found the price of Heineken beer to be between 2 to 10 percent higher 
than that of Beck’s.7
 
3.2 Results 
Our results suggest that Stackelberg competition with Beck’s as leader in a pricing game best 
describes our data8. Given the HSI for the manufacturers, we estimate demand and supply 
side parameters.  
Demand Side Estimates 
Using demographic variables such as income and squared income to characterise the effect of 
observable heterogeneity, we find lower price sensitivity for consumers with higher income, 
which is consistent with pre-existing literature (e.g. Nevo, 2001). We also find that 
households with lower incomes generally purchase more units in case of a promotion in a 
previous period. 
                                                 
7 Also important to note is the fact that, although the total quantity of Heineken and Beck’s sold in the US in the 
mid-90s increased, the US beer market is now a mature market with decreasing sales (see e.g. Heineken’s annual 
shareholder conference, 2001). 
8 We use a model comparison test suggested by Kadiyali (1996) and Kadiyali, Vilcassim & Chintagunta (1996). 






















































Willingness to pay 
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of Consumers Willingness to Pay (in USD/litre) (n = 50) 
WTP Max. Mean Min. Std. Dev. 
Beck’s 13.67 1.56 -8.49 13.92 
Heineken 17.29 1.94 -12.09 16.15 
 
 











Fig. 3: WTP-Distribution of Beck’s and Heineken (in USD/litre) 
Supply Side Estimates 
Table 4: Supply Side Estimates 
Parameter   Estimate 
Manufacturer Beck’s Constant 0.92 
(<.0001) 
  Energie 3.765 
(<.0001) 
 Heineken Constant 1.523 
(<.0001) 
 Energie -4.638 
(0.005) 
 shared cost Glas -0.03 
(<.0001) 
Wholesaler Constant 0.39 
(<.0001) 




Given the supply side estimates reported in table 4, we can calculate operation cost for 
manufacturers and the wholesaler (see table 5). Our results show a comparative disadvantage 
for Heineken given higher production cost compared to Beck’s. Various beer industry experts 
confirmed our results, suggesting higher production costs for Heineken are due to differences 
in the production process. While Beck’s beer is brewed using all natural ingredients, 
Heineken uses preservatives in the brewing process. The use of preservatives complicates the 
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production process, thereby increasing production cost. However, a production cost level that 
includes advertising, management and distribution costs was estimated  by R.D. Weinberg & 
Associates, whose 1996 study showed US mass beer producers to face a production cost of 
$0.79/litre (see Consumer Reports, 1996).  
 
Table 5: Calculated Operation Cost (USD/litre) 
Operation 
Cost Max. Mean Min. 
Std. 
dev. 
Beck’s 0.90 0.75 0.70 0.03 
Heineken 0.97 0.87 0.81 0.04 
Wholesaler 1.13 1.05 1.00 0.03 
 
While the calculated manufacturing cost seems to be valid, the wholesalers’ operation cost 
might be over estimated. This is caused by the fact that we assume the wholesaler serves as 
importer for both brands. Therefore derived operation cost also will include taxes and toll-
fees, which we cannot separate in our estimation. 
Our results show higher production costs for Heineken than for Beck’s, indicating a 
comparative production disadvantage for Heineken. In contrast, demand side estimates 
suggest a higher willingness to pay for Heineken, indicating some demand advantages. 
Taking both effects together, we find higher margins for Heineken than for Beck’s. These 
findings would deviate from the general framework were the leader (Beck’s) used to charge 
higher margins than the follower (Heineken).10 However, our results can be drawn back to a 
lower effect of market response (indicated by a higher willingness to pay) on the margin for 
Heineken than for Beck’s (see eq. 2.13). Taking both effects together, the positive demand 
effect seems to compensate for the comparative cost disadvantage of Heineken. Given more 
sold units and higher margins, Heineken claims more profit for all actors in the distribution 
line. 
4. Counterfactual Experiments 
Following Goldberg (1995), we use the estimated GMM results of the Stackelberg pricing 
game with Beck’s as leader to perform counterfactual experiments. Assuming exchange rate 
                                                 
10 Given identical firms the Stackelberg leader realizes higher margins due to the fact that the price set by the 
leader exceeds the price set by the follower. 
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changes in a range of –75% (appreciation of foreign currency) to +75% (depreciation of 
foreign currency), we compute equilibrium prices, quantities, market shares and margins for 
every different shock on the cost function. 
Given our estimation and the results reported in chapter 3, we can construct demand-supply 
relations for every stage in the distribution process that enable us to calculate the effects of 
exogenous cost shocks caused by currency variations. 
To clarify the process of counterfactual experiments within our framework, we assume for the 
sake of simplicity that manufacturers directly serve final consumers’ demand. However, later 
on we will use the complete set up to calculate the effects of exchange rate variation on 
market outcomes. Using the first order condition of a manufacturer as our supply function, we 
can rearrange equation (2.13) to model the supply decision: 
( ) ( )$ $ € $,p c c exr Δ q= +  (4.1) 
Note that the manufacturer’s margin Δ depends on consumers and competitive response. 
While we are not able to observe the production cost measured in terms of the manufacturer’s 
homeland currency, we assume that c€ can be described by a linear transformation of cost 
instruments Z$ measured in the currency of the target country and cost parameters ω. Given 
that unobservable effects influence the cost function a random error η is added. 
( ) ( )$ $ $ $, ;p c Z Δ qη ω= +  (4.2) 
Using the estimated cost parameters ω  and demand parameters β  reported in section 3, we 
can calculate equilibrium prices as 
( ) ( )* *$ $ $ $;p c Z Δ qω= +  (4.3) 
with final consumer demand given by 
( )* *$ , ;q d p X β= .11 (4.4) 
The demand function d(..) is constructed using the random coefficient model reported in 
section 2.1.12 Exogenous variables that shift the demand function are expressed by X. 
                                                 
11 While p and q affect each other, we use numerical simulation methods to calculate the outcomes. 
12 Note that any other specification can be used to model consumer demand. 
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While our model was estimated using exchange rate changes as additional instruments, the 
reported coefficients ω  are subject to the currency variations. It being the case that we are not 
able to separate the effect of these variations ex post, we investigate the effects of deviations 
from the average exchange rate on market outcomes.13 This is done by introducing an 
exogenous shock (1+r) into cost structure. The percentage deviation from the average is given 
by r. So equation (4.3) becomes  
( ) ( ) ( )$ $ $ $; 1r rp c Z r Δ qω= ⋅ + + , (4.5) 
and consumers demand can thus be written 
( )$ , ;r rq d p X β= . (4.6) 
Building the difference between the calculated prices given by equations (4.3) and (4.5), i.e. 








= ⋅ . (4.7) 
Using equation (4.7) to calculate the ERPT coefficient for every member of the distribution 
process, we obtain different values for manufacturer, wholesaler and retailer. Our results 
underline the fact that the effect of exchange rate variation decreases towards the final 
consumer price. However, we also find greater slopes for import prices compared to 
wholesale and final consumer prices that indicate different degrees of price adjustments. 
These findings are consistent with recent research in empirical trade theory: Campa and 
Goldberg (2006) demonstrate in an empirical study of over 21 OECD countries that the 
influence of currency fluctuations tend to be much lower on final consumer price than on 
import prices. Their results also give evidence to the fact that exchange rate pass-through is 
closely linked to margins in the distribution line. We find evidence for their results by 
showing that the changes in margin caused by currency variation decrease towards the end of 
the distribution line (see Fig. 3). 
The results reported in table 6 show ERPT coefficients less than one that decrease towards the 
final consumer price and thereby confirm our hypotheses 1 and 2. Our results are consistent 
with the empirical work of Glauben and Loy (2002), who report average ERPT-coefficients of 
                                                 
13 Note that currency variations have affected the observed market outcomes and thus the market equilibrium. 
We use the mean of exchange rate variation given in our data as average. 
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-0.65. They apply a Pricing to Market (PTM) and a Residual Demand Elasticity (RDE) 
approach to examine the influence of currency variations on German and Dutch beer exports 
using aggregated export prices. Various studies have shown that the effect of currency 
variations tends to be higher on export prices than on import prices (e.g. Goldberg & Knetter, 
1997).  
Table 6: ERPT-Coefficient given average exchange variations 
ERPT-Coefficient Mean 
, 'm Beck sϕ  0.542 
,m Heinekenϕ  0.551 
, 'w Beck sϕ  0.193 
,w Heinekenϕ  0.213 
, 'p Beck sϕ  0.153 
,p Heinekenϕ  0.172 
 
To analyze the effects of fluctuating exchange rates, we calculate market outcomes for n = 
150 different exchange rate changes. The main results are highlighted in figures 4 and 5. 
ERPT (Import-Price) 
 
% Exchange Rate 
 
ERPT (Wholesale- and Final Consumer-Price) 
 
% Exchange Rate 
 
Fig. 4. ERPT coefficients for various exchange rate changes 
Figure 4 highlights a slightly higher ERPT-coefficient of Heineiken compared to Beck’s. This 
can be drawn back to different sources of influence.Firstly, given a higher willingness to pay 
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for the brand Heineken, Heineken is able to charge higher prices in the market and therefore is 
able to avoid greater exchange-rate-induced price changes. Secondly, Heineken bears a higher 
production cost, which enforces a greater need to pass through. A third point that significantly 
impacts the pass through decision is the assumed asymmetric competition structure between 
Beck’s and Heineken. As our results show, the leader in a pricing game tends to pass through 




% Exchange Rate 
 
Margin (Wholesaler and Retailer)14
% Exchange Rate 
 
 
Fig. 5. Effect of Exchange Rate Changes on Margins 
Using the effect of exchange rate variations on prices, we calculated margins for all actors 
involved in the distribution process. Figure 5 shows that manufactures benefit more from 
appreciations of the dollar (here represented by negative values) than distributors. In the 
opposite case, when the dollar depreciates, manufacturers’ margins will suffer more than 
those of the distributors. This result can be traced back to the two effects pointed out before. 
As depreciation rises, the pressure of production cost on margins intensifies. Due to the elastic 
reaction of consumers, manufactures are not able to pass through the amount that would be 
necessary to compensate for the higher production cost (measured in terms of the target 
county currency), therefore margins tend to fall with depreciation. So we find hypothesis 2 to 
be confirmed: Margins serve as buffer for exchange rate variations. As this buffer is found to 
become lower towards the end of the distribution process, it is straightforward to argue that all 
                                                 
14 Note that the equal margins for both brands are the result of the assumed category maximizing behavior of 
wholesaler and retailer. 
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actors are affected differently by exchange rate variations. We can thereby confirm hypothesis 
4. 
 
 % Loss in Profit 
 
% Exchange Rate 
 
Fig. 6. Percentage Loss in Profit caused by Exchange Rate Changes 
As pointed out before, two different effects, i.e. pressure of production cost and consumer 
reaction, influence the manufacturer’s profit maximising strategy.As the pressure of 
production cost on the profit function decreases, Heineken can benefit more from 
appreciations than Beck’s – i.e. the advantage of demanders’ lower price sensibility tends to 
outweigh than the disadvantage of higher production costs. In the case of depreciation, the 
effect is the opposite: cost increases and Heineken suffers more than Beck’s. So we find a 
relatively higher loss in profits for Heineken given a depreciation of the dollar (see figure 6). 
Clearly the vulnerability given depreciation is higher for Heineken than for Beck’s. 
 
While the previous analysis examined the effects of various exchange rate variations given a 
special competition game, the following discussion concentrates on market outcomes given 
different types of competition and currency variations. 
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Table 7: Average ERPT-coefficient and margins given different competition games 
Bertrand Collusion 
 
∅ ERPT ∅ Margin ∅ ERPT ∅ Margin 
Beck’s 0.559 0.392 0.425 0.484 
Heineken 0.549 0.421 0.468 0.485 
Wholesaler: 
Beck’s 
0.196 0.419 0.159 0.405 
Wholesaler: 
Heineken 0.209 0.420 0.189 0.405 
Retailer: 
Beck’s 
0.155 0.374 0.128 0.368 
Retailer: 
Heineken 0.167 0.374 0.155 0.368 
 
Stackelberg: Beck’s → Heineken Stackelberg: Heineken → Beck’s 
 
∅ ERPT ∅ Margin ∅ ERPT ∅ Margin 
Beck’s 0.537 0.403 0.558 0.393 
Heineken 0.546 0.423 0.539 0.426 
Wholesaler: 
Beck’s 
0.189 0.418 0.196 0.419 
Wholesaler: 
Heineken 0.209 0.418 0.205 0.419 
Retailer: 
Beck’s 
0.149 0.373 0.155 0.374 
Retailer: 
Heineken 0.168 0.374 0.165 0.374 
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Our results show relatively low ERPT-coefficients for a cooperative pricing strategy played 
between manufactures. This can be drawn back to higher margins, in the case of collusion, 
which lower the pressure that results from depreciation of the dollar. Manufacturers’ margins 
will therefore react more elastically to price changes caused by currency variations and be 
able to take consumers’ reaction to price changes into account more. It should be mentioned 
that, given the structure of the Stackelberg game, followers’ market outcomes are nearly 
identical to the Bertrand pricing game results. Taken together, the results depicted in Table 7 
are prove  that exchange-rate-induced price changes increase with competitiveness, being the  
greatest in the case of complete competitive behaviour. These results are consistent with 
findings by Gross and Schmitt (2000), who show in a theoretical framework that the degree of 
ERPT is strongly influenced by the degree of competition. 
To conclude: our results evince that a cooperative manufacturer strategy directly impacts the 
degree of ERPT for distributors. Price agreements lead to changes in the distribution of 
margins: while manufacturers will gain margin, distributors will loose it. Both hypothesis 5 
and 6 can thus be confirmed. 
 
5. Conclusions and Further Research 
In this paper, we have investigated the influence of exchange rate variation on market 
conduct. We look at the US beer market, which upholds our stated assumptions. We find the 
pricing game in the beer market to be asymmetric and slightly cooperative. We also 
demonstrate that the ERPT decreases towards the final consumer. Our results reveal that 
foreign manufacturers gain (lose) more compared to other intermediaries in the distribution 
channel in case of an appreciation (depreciation) of the foreign currency. 
Due to the fact that we use a static rather than a dynamic framework, we are unable to draw 
conclusions about changes in competition caused by exchange rate shocks. However, further 
work should transfer our approach into a dynamic structural econometric model (e.g. Bajari, 




I. Willingness to Pay (WTP): 
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Fig. 7: Values of the Reaction Coefficient for the Follower given Different Market Shares 
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